This paper views temporary parental leave (leave from work to take care
of a sick child) as a household public good, produced with time inputs of the parents
as the only input. Assuming equal productivities in the production of temporary
parental leave and equal utility functions of the spouses, different household decision-
making processes are applied to develop theoretical hypotheses on sharing that
are thereafter tested empirically. The empirical estimations show that the decisionmaking
process of the spouses can be explained by a Stackelberg model with male
dominance. A stronger threat-point of the female is found to push the intra
household allocation of temporary parental leave towards greater sharing between
the spouses. In addition, an increase in the insurance ceiling will further sharing of
temporary parental leave in some families, while reducing it in others.
of a sick child) as a household public good, produced with time inputs of the parents
as the only input. Assuming equal productivities in the production of temporary
parental leave and equal utility functions of the spouses, different household decision-
making processes are applied to develop theoretical hypotheses on sharing that
are thereafter tested empirically. The empirical estimations show that the decisionmaking
process of the spouses can be explained by a Stackelberg model with male
dominance. A stronger threat-point of the female is found to push the intra
household allocation of temporary parental leave towards greater sharing between
the spouses. In addition, an increase in the insurance ceiling will further sharing of
temporary parental leave in some families, while reducing it in others.